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caae end c :)m;;ol reversal ot the judgment ot the Ill1noia
Supreme

cou1~t.
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CHAM BE R S O F"

JUS TICE WM . J . BRE N NAN . JR .

Jamnry 17, 1.972

Dear Chief:
I have your memorandum suggestjng reargument in No. 70-5061,
Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-26, Gooding v. Wilson and No. 70-45,
United States v. Brewster.
You indicate that you thought the votes in each of these cases was
4 to 3. My record shows that Gooding v. Wilson was 5 to 2 to affirm.
The votes to affirm were Thurgood, .B yron, Potter, Bill Douglas and
I. The votes to reverse were yours and Harry's. I've circulated a
proposed opinion for the Court on that premise.
My records do show that the votes in Kirby and Brewster were
both 4 to 3. In Kirby I've circulated an opinion which Bill Douglas
and Thurgood have joined. Byron has filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
In Brewster, my record indicates that Potter, Thurgood and
Harry have joined your opinion and Bill Douglas has joined my
dissent. Byron also voted to affirm.
You'll remember that my view on reargument of 4 to 3 cases is
that this is a matter for conference discussion. Certainly, as in the
case of S & E Contractors, if at least four of seven vote reargument
then there should be reargument. I would suppose someone would
have to make the motion and then a vote be taken as we did Friday
in S & E Contractors. In any event, I see no reason for rearguing
Gooding v. Wilson if the five who voted to affirm remain of that
view and join my proposed opinion.
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cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

January 17, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Chief:
I vote against putting down
for reargument the following cases:
- Gooding v. Wilson

No. 70-26
Uo. 70-45

•
No. 70-5061

- U. S. v. Brewster
- Kirby v. Illinois
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William 0. Douglas
The Chief Justice
CC:

The Conference

j}ntrrmu ~..rud 1li tq.t ~nitt{t j>tattg
2.fnsfri:ttgimt, ~. ~· 2llbi~~

January 17, 1972

CHAMBERS 01"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
We have now set two cases for reargwnent and
there are others that seem to me should be similarly
treated.
The following are my "nominations" for reargument.
No. 70-5061 --Kirby v. Illinois
No. 70-26
--Gooding v. Wilson
No. 70-45
-- U.S. v. Brewster
I previously indicated my willingness to haveS. & E.
Contractors v. U.S., and Lego v. Twomey reargued.

The

former is now scheduled for reargwnent and the latter has come
down.

There may be others, and generally I will vote to re-

argue any 4-3 case unless it is a ''JMH pewee."
To facilitate filing problems, I am sending individual
memos on each of the above.
Regards,

r

(Js.~

Qfourl cf tqt 'J!lttitth .ihttts
~as£ringtctt. ~. Qf. 2llfi'!.;l
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CHAMBERS OF

-JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 18, 1972

Dear Chief:
This is in response to your memorandum of
January 17 concerning reargum.ents.
I norninate for reargument the two abortion
cases, No. 70-18, Roe v. WadE~, and No. 70-40, Doe
v. Bolton. It seems to me that the importance of the
issues is such. that the cases merit full bench treatment.
I think another candidate is No. 70-58, Fein v.
Selective Service System.
So far as your nominations are concerned, my
reaction is that No. 70-45, United States v. Brewster,
because of its fundamental importance and precedent,
deserves reargument, and that No. 70-5061, Kirby v.
Illinois, should also be reconsidered. Justice White• s
separate concurrence certainly so indicates.
In S\unmary, I vote to set down for reargument
Nos. 70-18 a:nd 70-40, No. 70-45 and No. 70-5061. I
shall abide by the Conference• s reaction as to No. 70-58.
Sincerely,

;v.A.

The Chief Justice

---

cc: The Conference
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Kirby v. Illinois
Cert to Illinois SC

4--,t....~A, ~ ~ ~

QUESTIONS PRESENTED a

,( 4-v: &wt4.C.M

(1)

-

~~~ ....~1~¥-'

Does the Wade-Gilbert rule that pretrial line-ups

are critical stages of the prosecution at which the accused is
entitled to counsel apply to pre-indictment line-ups?
(2)

If so, should Wade and Gilbert be overruled?

FACTS
Petr and another man were charged with the day-light
robbery of a man walking along the street in Chicago.

Two

days after the robberyp police officers stopped the two men
and questioned them about an unrelated offense. Upon examinin ~
their identification, the officers noticed that each possessed
papers indicating that he was Willie Shard, the robbery victim.
Although the police were unaware of the robbery 1 they thought it
CONTROLLING CASESa

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 217 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

~-2--

suspicious that each would possess the sa- me ID. Upon ques~
""'
tioning, the police officers decided that the two should be
taken downtown.

In the meantime, Shard had reported the robbery

and the arresting officers checked the police records and
discovered that a Willie Shard had been victimized.

-

--

They

called Shard and told him that they had picked up two suspects
and asked him to come to the station to identify them.

A

police officer was sent to Shard's residence to pick him up
and bring him to the station.

--

Shard was brought into a squad

room where the two defendants and two police officers were
seated.

Shard immediately stated that the two were the men

-

who had robbed him.
Petr was tried by a jury and found guilty of the robbery
for which he received a 5 to 12-year sentence.

His conviction

was aff'd on appeal.
DISCUSSION
(1)

Question # 1
The Illinois SC held that Petr's 14th Amendment right to

due process (right to counsel) had not been violated by the
show-up after arrest in the absence of counsel.

I

The State

ct read Wade and Gilbert as requiring counsel only at post"
indictment line-ups.

This is the minority view, accepted by

5 states and no federal courts.
ha.~

the rationale of Wade applies
pr~and

The majority viewp that

ll~h

equal applicability to

post-indictment showings, is accepted by 12 states

and 7 of the Circuits.
When

+4.'-s

~

case was argued originally, there were three

opinions issued.

Justice Brennan, joined by JusticesDouglas

and Marshall, held that Wade and Gilbert contemplated no

,,

.

'

·'

,,

·"·:

.
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limitation to

post~indictment

line• ups.

Justice White

stated that Wade and Gilbert govern the instant case
and that the only real question is whether those cases
be overruled.

sh~uld

That he is unwilling to do without reargument

by the full Court.

Justice Stewart, joined by the Chief

Justice and Justice Blackmun, dissented on the ground that
Wade and Gilbert applied only to cases in which the show-up
occurred after the defendant was indicted.

The judgment of

the Court, then, prior to this reargument was 4-3) with Justice
White apparently willing to reconsider after hearing argument
anew.

Therefore, it is apparent that you and Justice Rehn-

quits are likely to cast the "swing" votes in this case.
The first question, whether Wade-Gilbert applies only
to post-indictment lineups, is, for me, a rather easy questiori.

There is language at two

pm~nts

in the Opinion for the

Court (Brennan, J.) in which he states the holding to be that
"there can be little d~ubt that for Wade the :east-indictment
lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution • • • " Id. at
237.

Also, when stating the question, Brennan states that

it is "whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial
are tb be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post-indictment
lineup • •

"

Id. at 219.

indicating that Wade

-

The only other grain of text

could b~roperly
"

limited to its facts

is the brief discussion concerning the absence of "countervailing policy considerations against the requirement of the
presence of counsel.''

Id. at 237.

On this score the Court

points out that prompt identifications will not be

\

forestalled since attorneys for Wade and Gilbert had already

,.

.

'

,.

- .. 4-..,

been appointed and were available.

The Court goes on, how-

ever, to point out that "we leave open the question whether

ddiilidiiidd the presence of substitute counsel might suffice
where notification and presence of the suspect's own counsel
would result in prejudicial delay."

Id. Finally, it may be

noted that in the facts of each case the defendants were both
already under indictment.

This is the extent of the textual

support for the proposition that Wade-Gjlbert may be read
restrictively.
The evidence on the other side is overpowering.

The

thesis of the Wade and Gilbert opinions is that the right

--

to counsel g uaranteed by the 6th Amendment, through the 14th,
. l
extends outside the courtroom and into the ItpretrLa
area "

-

t o those points in the criminal process where "critical conoccur and "where
the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality."

Id. at 224.

At

other points the Court makes clear that the right to counsel
contemplates the right to "meaningfully cross-examine"
witnesses against him.

Id. at 223-24.

The Court also

states,
"the accused is guaranteed that he need not s!5and
alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a
fair trial." ID. at 226.
Without belaboring the point further, I think a fair reading
of the Brennan opinion undercuts pretty thoroughly the
notion that its principle applies in cases of post-mndictment confrontations only.

.,

".t; ••

,.
t

...

... s . . -

I

J

Secondly, the other opinions concurring in the tudgment
that the right to counsel applies at the lineup stage (Clark,
Black, Fortas) each agree separately that the right exists
but none of those opinions even intimates that the ruling
is restricted to post-indictment lineups.

Clark's short

opinion would seem, most clearly of the three, to contemplate application of the rule to pre-indictment lineups.
His thesis is that when Miranda held that an accused had
a right to an attorney at a "custodial interrogation" he
surely had the same right for all lineups.
Thirdly, the dissenting Justices make a point of pointing
out the breadth of the majorityvs opiniona
"The rule applies to all lineups • • • regardless
of when the identification occurs, in time or place,
and whether before or after indictment or information."
Id. at 251.
The majority chose not to counter this assertion in the dissent
although Justice Brennan did feel compelled to respond to
other broad assertions in the same paragraph of the dissent.
See, footnote 33, Pp 241-42 . in which the majority counters
the contention that the rule applies regardless of the eire
cumstances of the case.
If this case were merely one of parsing the language of
Wade and Gilbert to determine what its scope is, I think this
case would present no problems.

If one goes beyond the terms

inions and asks whether there is any rational

-

rawing a line at the indictment s·1l:age, I still think

the problem is not a difficult one.

If counsel serves a

valuable function at any lineup, he serves that same purpose
whether the accused has been indicted or not.

I think this

--6-is the teaching of Escobedo and Miranda.

The former

recog~

nized a right to counsel at a stage in which the investigation has "focused" on the accused.

Miranda, in footnote

4 of the majority opinion, says that "focusing" has occurred

-

whenever the accused is interrogated while in custody, i.e.,
cusodial interrogation.

Illinois argues that the show~ in this case was purely
investigatory and that the case had not yet sufficiently
focused on the defendants to constitute an accusatory stage
of the case.

That argument has little force on this record.

The police had in custody two men who had in their possession
articles of identification and travelers checks with the name
of the victim on them.
robbed by two men.

The victim has recently reported being

The police immediately called Shard and

asked him to come to the station.

There was little room for

doubt that the police thought they had the perpetrators of
the robbery.

Even if they were not sure, it is almost uncon-

trovertable that they had significantly focused on the accused.
The impotance of the sho~ on these facts cannot be underestimated.

The identification of the two my the victim was

predictably the key element in the c~~

Petr and his friend

had attempted to explain that they stumbled aiCross the
an
'"
IDs in j. alley. A positive identification would seal their
fate, a negative investigation might have lead to their
release.
There is the argument, on the other side, that a requirement of counsel at this stage will unnecessarily delay
investigations and will impose an administrative burden on
the states.

A burden there is.

But it is no more cumbersome

)

- ... 7-than the burden imposed by Miranda.

The state must provide

/

the accused with the opportunity to state whether he wishes t
have counsel at the lineup.

If he so desires, a lineup must

be postponed until counsel is available.

The procedure would

be precisely the same, and the interference with the investigative process no more difficult, as the case of an in-custody interrogation.

Of course, exceptions might still be

allowed for exigent circumstances, such as on-the-scene
show-ups.

Several courts

ha~

held since Wade was decided

that in the exigent circumstance in which a suspect is apprehended shortly after a crime, the police would be justified
in taking the arrestee back to the scene of the crime and
~ u.~.

"·

Ruqe.l~

showing him to the victim or other eyewitnesses.

1\

.,or

1
F'.?rN

This is

llf/0 ,

justified by the dual interests in obtaining a quick affirmatiion
that they have the

r~t

man so the investigation may cease

(or continue, depending on the result of the showing}.

Also

the witness's memory is likely to be freshest immediately
after the incidentJ details which fade with time may still be
fresh several minutes or hours after the commission of a
crime.

While those interests of the law enforcement personnel

may justify a counsel-less showup under exigent circumstances,
they do not justify the broadscale use of counsel-less lineups
prior to indictment.
One final note.

The California amicus brief states, at

page l2g that "the innocent suspect in particular has a
common, nonadversary interest with the policer the expeditious
conduct of an identification procedure which may bring about
his release from custody."

Since it is the prospect of mis-

identification which is the wellspring for all of the Court 0 s
concern in this area, I think it crucial to examine whether

.,

·~

--8- ...

the potential victim of a misidentification would sensibly
prefer to have an immediate counsel-less show-up.

I think

that if I were arrested because I matched the description
someone had given of a robber or other criminal, I would
most certainly want the aid of an attorney in a hurry.
Once I am identified--mistakenly--in a lineup I may never
be able to undo that damage.

The California statement

is the product of the basic assumption,shared by many who
look upon constitutional-prmeedural protections as nothing
but impediments to law enforcement designed to cuddle and '
coddle, that the innocent have nothing to fear fr~ the
To +-J. e. ~l1-o .. "f 1 OGIIlaw. ~ criminal justice system is built on the notion that
it is hard for the government to convict, and the central
purpose of the whole complicated system is that it is better
that a few guilty go free than that one innocent man be
wrongly convicted.

It may be the balance swings too far in

one direction or the other, but the underlying assumption
seems to me to be unassailable.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart's takes the
tact that the lineup-counsel requirement only comes into
~ Y after indictment.

The formal charge marks, so the

dissent argues, the momemt when the "criminal investigation
has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced."
in any practical sense, simply is not so.

This,

In many cases

the police have focused attention on one prime target and
have made the decision that this is the man whom they will
seek to indict--it is no longer the broad-based investigation
into an unsolved crime.

Again, it seems to me that Miranda

and Escobedo effectively recognized the

fa~cy

of attempting

<•

I

.,

--9--

to find some mechanical point in the process to invoke the
constitutional right to counsel.

Justice Stewart also

makes the argument that the state is more likely to have
already provided an indicted man with an attorney, i.e. a
post-indictment rule would be administratively easier to
operate.

Finally, he indicates that in pre-indictment

cases, there is the rule of Stovall v. Denno applying the due
process to void any lineups which are shown to be unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive of irreparable misidentification.
This, it would seem, begs the question.

One of the reasons

for having counsel after an indictment is to guard against
misidentification.

The mere additional judicial argument

does not explain why the line should be drawn at the indictment stage.

The dissent is unpersuasive.

Even Justice White

who wrote the dissents in Wade and Gilbert was unwilling to
join Stewart's opinion here.

Either the Court must go all

the way and repudiate these cases or it must find some more
logical cutoff point for the right to counsel (the point which
I find most logical is the exigent circumstances test discussed
briefly above).

(2)

Question # 2
Assuming that the Court is unable to draw a line at

the indictment stage, then it may wish to consider reversing
its prior de<i!t.sions.

This course is urged on the Court by

both the Respondent, State of Illinois, and the amicus from
California.

That step would obviously be a giant one for

the Court and will be trumpeted throughout the country as
the harbinger of a new era on the Court--it will stand as one

,.

--10- ...

of the first indicia of the impact of the Nixon appointments
on Warren Court precedents.

Therefore, the decision will

necessarily be one that will be long and carefully considered
by any Justices voting to overrule Wade-Gilbert.

At this

point in time, it would probably not be terribly helpful
to write either a defense or an attack on the lineup-counsel
rule.

Rather, it may be beneficial to look briefly at the

underpinnings of Wade to determine what basis might be available for justifying rejection of that ruling less than 5
~ears

after it was announced.
The notion that an accused is entitled to counsel at a

lineup is apparently premised on two considerations.

First,

the presence of the accused's lawyer is likely to assure to
a greater degree that the lineup will be conducted in an
relatively free of suggestive circumstances.

ment

envirron~

The potential

for the police to "tip-off" the witnes~ Jgich person in the
A

lineup is the desired choice will be minimized.

\

~·

Indeed, it

may have been contemplated that an attorney might make
suggestions to assure a fair lineup in a spirit of cooperation
with the police.

Second, an attorney who was present at the

confrontation will be better able to cross ... examine the
identifying i itness at trial as to the circumstances of his
out-of-court identification.

One of the problems which

existed before Wade, much like the problem before Miranda,
was that there was never any reliable manner for determining
what actually occurred at the police-accused confrontation.
Too frequently the courts were presented with two stories which
differed dramatically in their account of a particular confrontation.

In such testimonial deadlocks, judges, understandably,

.•

--11--

often chose to believe the testimony of the police, who generally
had less reason to lie and a better track record for reliability than the ordinary defendant.

While introducing an attorney

into the confrontation might not have completely put to
rest the "lieing match" aspects of many pretrial meetings,
it probably did narrow the limits of fabrication on each
side.

The police are less likely to lie when they know that on

cross-examination they may not be able to withstand a
searching inquiry.

Likewise, the defendant's attorney is

likely to be much less willing to embellish the facts of the
pretrial confrontat~ion than is an accused who might feel

""'

that he has nothing to lose.
Neither of the briefs (California or Illinois) persuades
me that the Court was in error in finding these interests
sufficient to justify a holding calling for expansion of the
right to counsel.

The primary attack of both briefs is

centered on the argument that counsel is ineffective at the
lineup.

He has no mandatory power to tell the police how the

lineups are to be run.
to stand for the lineup.

He cannot advise his client to refuse
Furthermore, it is even suggested that

the nature of the adversary process is such that an attorney
will strive for a suggestive lineup in order

{o

provide a

basis for reversal at a later point.
Several points should be made in rebuttal to these
assertions.

First, while the attorney has no power to compel

a nonsuggestive lineup, his mere presence is likely to
assure a more acceptable attempt on the part of the police.
Even if he does not say a word in his client's behalf, his
watchful presense must certainly have an effect on the manner

--12--

in which the array is presented and on the extent to which

.

,;

the officers make suggestive comments.
It is, secondly, unfortunate that the Court does not
have the opportunity to perform some empirical experiments
of its own.

Or, at the least, to view a representative sample

of lineups.

Last year many of the CADC law clerks were

per~

mitted to attend local lineups to see how they progress.

On

one occasion Judge Wilkey went along to gain some firsthand
experience himself.

My impressron was that the police and

the attorneys present (mostly court-appointed) cooperated
cordially in preparing the array for the identification.
The attorney could tell his client where to stand, could instruct him to walk and talk normally, could suggest that
one or another person be added to or deleted from the array,
could suggest that his client either take off are put on an
article of clothing to assure that he did not stick out
because of his clothes, etc.

There appeared to be none of

the expected adversariness about the procedure; the two
sides seemed able to work fluidly together.

The attorney

was routinely provided with the description of his client
given by the witness to the police.

Also, a photo of the

array was routinely taken and preserved by the Government to
introduce at trial to show that the lineup was free of
suggestivity.

This entire procedure has, in the District, been

codified into police regulations drafted by the Department 8 s
Legal Counsel Office.

With the procedure this highly developed

it is not surprising that attorneys no longer find it of as
great value to be present at the confrontation

as they might
I

have at some former time (see citation to Read Study. pp
33-39).
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The argument has also been made that the attorney's
presense is not valuable because the attorney may not
take the stand to testify about the circumstances of the
lineup.

But, as I view the utility of cross-examinationp he

need not testify.

Rather he asks the witness to describe the

circumstances of the ide ntification and has a basis to impeach
if the witness deviates from the facts as he knows them.
The briefs in this case suffer somewhat because Petr has
not undertaken to defend in any detail the Wade principle.
We have not been cited to any law review or other authorities
which defend the side of the coin opposite to the tact taken
by the two states arguning in this case.
decision to

Before any serious

'

reverse Wade ~ undertaken--at least on the basis

of the practical considerations proffered by Respondent and
amicus--a thorough search of the authorities

sh~uld

be

undertaken.
One final point, this particular case would seem to be a
poor one in which to repudiate Wade and Gilbert.

The facts

in the case are not very sympathetic to the govermment.
This was the sort of one-on-one showup which is likely
to lead to misidentification.

The Illinois Supreme Court

held that in light of the totality of the circumstances
the showup was not impermissibly suggestive.

That question

is not now, strictly speaking, before the Court since the
grant of cert was limited to the pre-indictment counsel question.

··?~

Vle.VII

of

Nevertheless, the fact that the lineup did not comport
A

with what the Court could refer to as good police practice,
this might be a poor case in which to announce that the
counsel requirement has been demonstrated to be no longer

...
'
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(

of practical utility.
CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of the problem, and because
the Petr does not persuasively defend the Wade rule, I have
written more than I intended to write.

While I have indicated

a clear position on this case, I do not know
this memo 5 years ago before Wade was
made the same recommendation.

tha~

decided;~

were I writing
I would have

But, that point has been passed

and the burden has shifted to those who wish to wipe away
what the Court has already done.

On the question whether

Wade may be restricted in its applability to post-indictment lineups, I think that the burden has clearly not been
met.

Justice Stewart's attempt does not succeed.

On the

w~~lt.
more fundam~tal question whether 5R4 a~ should be thrown

out, the evidence gathered to date is not

compell~

enough

to justify repudiation of Wade on the ground that the
Court efred as a matter of empirical knowledge.

That

leaves the Court only with the choice of stating that the
change in the judicial philosophy of new members on the Court
since 1967 (5 of those on the

C:..~;o.+

Wade~are

gone, replaced by

Justice Marshall and the 4 Nixon appointees).

That is a step

which I doubt the Court is prepared to take at this early
date.
I wouldo therefore, reverse in a short opinion, indit-h~fl

eating

wh~le

Wade-Gilbert, like all other precedents,will

A

continue to be the subject of close scrutiny, so long as it
survives no distinction may be drawn between the pre and post•
indictment

lineup~ .

Conceivably, in dicta, the Court might

lay down a dividing line, as the Brennan opinion appears to do

...

..

.\~

' ..
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in his draft (arrest,

REVERSE

..

~

abs~t

exigent circumstsnces).
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KIRBY v. ILLINOIS No. 70-5061
Argued 3/21/72
Tentative Impressions*
See the notes of my views on the bench memo, prepared by
Larry.
Tentative Views:

1. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 and Gilbert, 388 U. S. 263 establish
"a per se exclusionary rule" as to testimony with respect to identification at a line-up where the suspect does not have counsel.

The

majority opinions give two reasons: (i) that such a rule is necessary
as a sanction for law enforcement; and (ii) that it promotes fairness
in criminal trials. On the first point, in Gilbert the Court said:
"Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony
can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the ooc:used's constitutuional
right to the presence of his counsel at the critical
line-up. " 388 U. S. 273
If I had been on the Court, I would have joined with Justices White,

stewart and Harlan in dissenting.
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the princi:r:>al briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

.. '

2.
2. Wade and Gilbert involved post-indictment line-ups. This
case (Kirby) involved a pre-indictment "show-up". In the two earlier
cases it was held that a "line-up" is a "critical stage" in a criminal
prosecution, requiring counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
I suppose we could hold - as Justice stewart's tentative draft

-

opinion does - that there is a valid distinction between a post-indictment
and a pre-indictment identification. Although I may be willing to accept
this view, I doubt that such a distinction is necessarily sound.
It is true that an indictment usually follows a preliminary hearing,
and the Court has held that counsel is required at such a hearing.

Thus,

an accused person would then have counsel representing him. Moreover
the stage is somewhat more "critical" than the pre-indictment "show-up".
The

1~

can be quite preliminary, and can benefit the innocent who

might otherwise be detained.
But facts and circumstances vary quite widely, and - for reasons
stated by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in Wade - I am not sure that
a distinction is justified on principle .
.,,,L<l(,~ ~ C.tC.~

3. I am ef'f'8tHui to "per se exclusioary rules" for the purpose
of disiciplining police officers unless the Constitution clearly mandates
them.

The Constitution does require the right to counsel, but only

"in criminal prosecutions". I do not think it can be said that every

3.
identification of a suspect, or even of a person indicted, is a part of
"a criminal prosecution".
We have already encrusted the criminal trial with a number of
"per se exclusionary rules". No other country has imposed such a
straight-jacket on its criminal system and on law enforcement.
4. It is far wiser, if one takes the long view, to apply the
stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 concept that an identification always
can be excluded if it was unduly suggestive or otherwise violated
fundamental fairness. In stovall, the Court refused to make Wade and
Gilbert retroactive for several reasons. One of these was because in the Wade-Gilbert type of situation:
"It remains open to all persons to allege and prov~
as stovall att empts to do in this case , that the
confrontation resulted in such unfairness that it
infringed his right to due process of law. See
Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199 (CA 4 1966)."

J
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Kirby v. Illinois

Judge:
Attached you will finds (1) the 3d draft of Justice
Brennan's dissent in this prewaccusation lineup vase; and
(2) Just •1ce White's separate statement dissenting because of
the binding influence of Wade and Gilbert.
Justice Brennan's dissent is changed only in that he
has examined the briefs in three cases dealing with the
Wade-Gilbert problem--Foster, Coleman, and Stovall--and
has demonstrated that the Court entirely ignored the rationale
suggested in Justice Stewart's opinion.
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Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-5061
PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE THEORY
My note yesterday failed to make clear the thesis I am
suggesting.

I will, therefore, restate it here.

Wade-Gilbert, like all rules extending the right to
counsel to new areas, was written in the face of serious
practical problems.

Whenever the procedural protections

accorded the accused are expanded they, necessarily, make the
prosecutor's task more difficult.

Sometimes the problem is

simply a financial one for the states--breathing more lawyers
into the system.

In other cases, however, the primary diffi-

culty of a new right to counsel rule might be its impact on
th~

fluid administration of justice.

This is such a case.

The interests in this case--itemized in Justice White's
Wade dissent--inhere in the efficient investigation of unsolved crime.

Immediately upon apprehending a suspect it

is in the interest of the police to obtain a positive or
negative investigation.

If the police can hold a lineup

immediately they may determine whether they have the right
man or the wrong man.

If they have the wrong man it will

signal the police that their investigation must continue.
Moreover, there is a substantial interest in promptitude
because, as any investigator knows, the memories of victims
and witnesses fades radidly after a crime.

If the police are

forced to hold the suspect until such time as counsel can be
appointed and a convenient time arranged for a showing (remember that the witnesses, the accused 9 the prosecutorp and
his attorney must all meet at the same time--conceivably
this might entail a delay of several days).

Additionally,

it is in the best interests of the accused--if he is innocent--

,-

--2-to have a quick showing in

~der

that he can be released,

rather than lanquishing in jail awaiting an identification.
How did Wade address these practical problems with a
rule that counsel is required at every lineup?
it dodged the tough questions.

By indirection,

It focused on the problem

as if the accused already had counsel and it was simply a
matter of giving him a call.

Or, if

t~ime

did not permit

contacting the accused's attorney, substitute counsel might
be permissible.

This answer clearly assumes that counsel has

already been appointed.

In fact, the majority specifically

nated that both Wade and Gilbert already had counsel appointed
to represent them.

With this response of the majorityvs in

mind, and emphasizing that the Court was clearly presented
with both a request to extend the counsel right to every
lineup and a lising of the prtiactical impediments, the several
statements that the cases held lineups essential for "postindictment showings takes on added significance.
You are on record, in Argersinger, as doubting the efficacy
at the lineup stage
of prophylactic rules. Because counsel/may be necessary to
assure a fair trial in some cases, the Court in Wade mandated
that counsel be present in every post-indictment case.

To

enforce the prophylactic rule the Court imposed a per se
exclusionary rule which operates to render inadmissible
post-indictment
every/pretrial lineup in which counsel was not provided,
irrespective how professionally the lineup was conducted.
You may wonder whether either the rigid prophylaxis or the
per se exclusionary rule are justified under the fundamental
fairness test of due process.

And, if this case squarely

presented the need to re-examine those precepts, you might

·'
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join the dissenters in that case.

But this case, does not

require re-examination of the basic premise since it raises
a question which is beyond the scope of Wade.

The most

fundamental of restraintist notions compel that Justices not
reach out to overrule conSDtitutional decisions where to so
so is not necessary to an appropriate disposition of the case
before the Court.
The Court has been shown no reason to do today what it
refused to do in 1967 when Wade was written. The practical
barriers to the total extension of the prophylactic & exclusionary rules are as formidable today as they were then.
You could register your vote to affirm on the basis that you
are content to leave matters where you understand them to
have been left in Wade.

The critical line which was drawn

in Wade is whether or not the investigation has sufficiently
progressed to the point at which counsel has already been
appointed.

Usually this is the indictment stage.

But, often,

as Justuce Stewart J.llX)tes , formal accusa·tion and appointment
of counsel precede indictment and you can agree with Justice
Stewart that Wade was written to apply at that stage since, like
after an indictment , counsel is available.
You might close by reminding the dissenters that you
approve of the rationale of Stovall that the due process
clause renders inadmissible any identification which takes
place under circumstances which lead to the possibility of an
irreparably mistaken identification.

This rule operates

whether or not the accused has counsel at the showing , and
it stands to assure that the rights of the accused will not
go begging .

.. ..
'

''

'

'·

. ' ,.
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--4-NOTE:

This is not the approach followed by Justice Stewart.

His effort is to distinguish Wade in terms of the language
of the opinion and the constitutional principles on which the
case is based.

That effort totally fails as Justice Brennan

illustrates.
One of the arguments which will be made is that drrawing
a line at the formal accusation stage will permit easy
subversion.

Police will simply embark upon the practice of

holding all lineups before counsel is appointed.
at least two answers to this assertion.

There are

First, it presupposes

a level of disingenuousness on the part of federal and state
prosecurorial officials which is not warranted by anything
other than bald assertion.

Second, we know that some

juris~

dictions, notably the District of Columbia, have established
an enviable set of police regulations governing lineups.
Those regulations are written and available and can be cited
as a model of regularized procedure.

Lineups are held in

virtually every case and the lineup occurs very shortly after
arraignment and appointment of counsel.

Counsel and prosecutor

cooperate to place the accused in a lineup which will not
allow him to stand out.

There is no real likelihood that the

DC police are going to throw out their well established and
fluid procedure.
I urge you to consider a short opinion along these lines.

LAH

.' ,....
.)

..

ALTERNATE THEORY
(1)

\~

----

Focus on following language in Wade:

"No substantial countervai l ing policy considerations
have been advanced against the requirement of presence
of counsel. Concern is expressed that the requirement
will forestall prompt identifications and result in
obstruction of the confrontations . As for the first ,
we note that in the two cases in which the right to
counsel is today held to applyp counsel has already
been appointed and no argument is made in either case
that notice to counsel would have prejudicially delayed
the confrontations. Moreover, we leave open the question
whether the presence of substitute counsel might not suffice
where notification and presence of the suspectis own
counsel would result in prejudicial delay.

-

A footnote appended to the above discussion repeats the salient
point:
"Although the right to counsel usually means a right to
the suspect ' s own counsel , provision for substitute
counsel may be justified on the ground that the
subst i tute counsel 9 s presence may eliminate the hazards
which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence
of the suspect ' s own counsel,"
(2)

Justice White ' s dissent may have been the force causing

the majority to note the practical aspects of their opinion .
He speaks of the state's "valid interests" in the "prompt
and efficient enforcement of its criminal laws."
"Identifications frequently take place after the arrest but
before an indictment is returned or an information is
filed. The police may have arrested a suspect on probable cause but may still have the wrong man. Both the
suspect and the State have every interest in the prompt
and early identification at that stage . , , . Unavoidably , however , the absolute rule requiring the presence
of counsel will cause significant delay and it may
very well result in no pretrial identification at all.

·.
'

..
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"Counsel must be appointed and a time arranged convenient
for him and the witness . .

..

(3)

II

A look at the briefs in Wade--especially the SG's brief--

it is by bet will indicate that one of

tl~

arguments raised

was that there were significant practical problems with
counsel at lineups.

And, it is also my bet, that they will

indicate that the gravest practical problems arise where the

~
lliL • counsel.

accused has not yet been r.;•
(4)

~

The majority's indirect to the arguments of the SG and
A

the dissenters was simply to limit the decision to post-indictment confrontations, since the accused will already have
been appointed counsel.

That is certainly the import of the

language quoted in (1) above referring to the fact that he
already has counsel.
(5)

Viewed in this light, the holding requested in Kirby

is an extension that the Court was unwilling to make
that time.

at

You may agree with the dissenters in this case

that a good lawyer would read the Wade thesis as equally
applicable to all lineups, whether pre or post-indictment.
While you have reservations about the Court's power to
write exclusionary rules to effectuate Constitutional
decisions, you need not take issue with Wade in this case
because--at least in terms of the practical application of
the Wade rule--Kirby marks an extension.
(6)

If this case is a test of "principled constitutional

adjudication" it might be well to point out that any lack of
principle is attributable directly to Wade iteelf.

It is

strange that the dissenters can now accuse the majority of
being unprincipled because they refuse to do what the majority
in Wade itself refused to do.

--3- ..

(7)

While you are unwilling to extend Wade , you may note that

the constitutional protection at which Wade was primarily aimed .. protection against suggestive showings which might lead to
irreparable

misidentification~-is

due process clause.

still protected under the

That clause is breferable at any rate

since it requires no per se rules but asks only a case-by-case
application.

I think a separate concurrence along these lines would have
. o f h onesty .
t h e bene f· 1t

I t h as t h e d"1s~vantage
J.. 1y
o f tac1t

recognizing that the line drawn (indictment) is not one derived from the Constitution itself .

If this view commends

itself ·t o youp I can write a two or three page opinion in a
matter of hours .

If this view does not commend itself to

you , I recommend that you simply concur in the result without
stating anything at all .

LAH

~nprtmt

Qftturl ttf tqt ~tb ~tnf.tg
._-aslpnghm, ~. <q. 2llgt'!~ '

I

II ,

CHAMBERS OF"

b,:,rSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 2, 1972

Re:

I

I

70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court in this
case.
Sincerely,

I

r

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS Of"

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

May 2, 1972

RE: No. 70-5061 -Kirby v. Illinois
Dear Potter :
In due course I shall circulate a
dissent in the above.

Mr. Just ice Stewart
cc:The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

STICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 5, 1972

Re:

No. 70-5061

-

Kirby v. Illinois

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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I ,.
Mr. Justice Stewart

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

May 8, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Bill:
In No. 70-5061 - Kirby v.
Illinois, please join me in your
dissent.

..

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Brennan
CC:

The Conference
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 8, 1972

No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois
In accord with our discussion, I would appreciate your drafting

a very brief cmeurring opinion along the lines of my "tentative views".
If we had more time, I would like to elaborate a good deal on

these - wlick, in essence, are in accord with your "exigent circumstances" view.
But it seems to me that already we are behind with our opinions
(with 5 court opinions still not yet drafted, plus concurrences and
dissents), and accordingly I am thinking in Kir)Jy primarily of keeping
my options open for the future. I will do this by refraining from joining
rule
in a new 'f>er se't Unfortunately, as I view it, the Court over the years
has converted our Constitution from a great document of principle into

an infiexible criminal code. This was never intended, and is contrary
to the basic concept of an enduring constitution.
L. F. P., Jr.

~~

-~·

'
•'.

~;r-~:
~ ·~{~~·

.
. ..

"

•r

.

.\:,

,.

'

'4..

'

,

..

··~

'
Y!·.·

'

'It:;\'

:
'•

':

"

May 8, 1972

Re:

~o.

70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois

Dear Potter:
I will cmcur with the affirmance 1n your opinion, but may

"

express separately - if I can arttculate them - the views I stated
at the Conference.
Sincerely,

.,•

Mr. JUstice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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Kirby v. Illinois, 70-5061

Judge:
Attached you will find Justice Stewart's proposed

op~

inion for the Ct in Kirby, involving the question whether the
Wade counsel requirement applies to pre-indictment lineups.
This draft, although somewhat longer than his former dissent
for the 7-man Ct, is largely unchanged. He does make one
p
noteworthy modification. Rather tha~rawing the line at
;J
the indictment, he now draws the line "initiation of adver1
sary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by way of formal
charge, pre]iminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. " G I'

7)

I am attaching, from the file on this case, my bench memo
ahd your "Tentative views."

As my memo reflects, I think

that Justice Stewartvs view is clearly unacceptable.
pp. 2-9 of my bench memo.)

(See

Rather than restating the reasons

for my disagreement, I will refer you to the remarks in my
memo.

Your tentative notes, as I read them, indicate that

your vote is bottomed on a disagreement with the per se exclusionary rule of Wade-Gilbert.

As I said in my memo, that

may be a reason to vote to overrule Wade but it does not serve
as a solid basis for distinguishing Wade here.

Is there really

any serious doubt that the showup in this case was any less a
critical stage than the lineup in Wade?

Is the defendant's

interest in assuring a fair showing or in preserving the
facts of the showing for cross"examination at trial at all
diminished?
Your views suggest an alternative, which to me, seems
much more sensible.

It is true that there are a wide range

of unforeseeable cases in which lineups or showups occur.

.

" •.

'
"···'

.-

'

--2-Some occur shortly after the commission of the crime when
a suspect is picked up near the scene of the crime and is
returned to be viewed by the victim.

In such a case the

delay involved in obtaining an attorney for the accused
a

suspect might well cause /hurtful

lag in the investigation.

If the wrong man has been apprehended, the police need to
know that fact so that the investigation may be resumed.
Moreover, the witness's memory is likely to be freshest
immediately after the crime.
stances as well in which

There might be other circum-

one or both of two considerations

occurs (1) some exigent circumstance makes an immediate
lineup essential

t~he

criminal investigation without the

delay attendant upon appointing an attorney to assist with a
I',.,/ 1 ,_ e.- J, end?..

formal lineup; or (2) in a rare case conceivably tqe
~

not focused upon any one suspect but ..J..s

eas~ h~

~VYIJ

stil~-9'

broadbased

investigation (for instance, a case might arise in which a
woman is mugged on the grounds of a state hospital and the
police take her to a room in the hospital and allow her to
see all of the patients who were conceivably in the area at
the time of the crime--in this case it would be silly to
require counsel for each inmate).

I would urge you to think

seriously about adopting an "exigent circumstances" rule
rather than any rigid artificial rule.
I think Justice White has the soundest view in this case.
While he has no love for Wade & Gilbert, he recognizes that
unless they are to be overruled they control the instant case.

LAH

5/9/72- .. LAH
Res Kirby v. Illinois, No . 70-5061
Judges
Attached is the first draft of Justice Brennan's dis~t
,..
in this pre--indictment lineup case. Effectively, I think, it
"'

obliterates Justice Stewart's efforts to distinguish WadeeGilbert.

I can add nothing to his discussion on the discussion

of these precedents.

Any intelligent lawyer reading Wade and

Gilbert and the other cases cited by Justice Brennan (Stovall
and Foster)

I think would come to the conclusion that there

is no rational basis for drawing a line of constitutional
significance at the artificial stage of "formal accusation."
I would like to reiterate that Wade is written in such
a fashion that it has little practical effect in terms of
the thing that seems to concern you--per se exclusion.

If

the petitioner was without counsel , the witness's testimony
about the pretrial confrontation is per se excluded.

Butp if

an "independent source" can be found--as it almost always
can where the victim had any reasonable opportunity to view
the criminal during the crime-@the witness may then still be
permitted to make an in-court identification.

Moreover , even

if a counselless lineup is introduced at trial , or even if
the TC erred in finding an independent source , the harmless
error doctrine still prevents reversal if ,
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

loosel~

speakingp

With those safety

valves built into the system , I would think that the clearly
guilty defendant rarely reaps any ultimate benefit from the
rule.
LAH

<!f~nrt ~f tlrt ~ttittb ~tattg
~aglrmgt~n.
<!f. zog;Jl.~

j;u:puuu
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May 18, 1972
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

No. 70-5061 -- Kirby v. illinois

Dear Potter:
Please amend my concurring statement to read
as follows:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
I agree that the right to counsel attaches as
soon as criminal charges are formally made
against an accused and he becomes the subject of a 11 criminal prosecution.'' Therefore
I join in the Court's opinion and holding.
Cf. Colemanv. Alabama, 399U.S. 1, 21
(dissenting opinion).

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

C!fond of tltt 'Jlittitt~ $5tl:ti{a'ma:a-Iyingto-n.'l3. C!f. 2ll6iJL-;1

.§ttpt"tntt

_,

I

CHAMBERS OF

May 18 1 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

(
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference

·.

~

'

.

'

·.

<

•

5/24/72- ... LAH
Rea Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70 5061
8

Judge:
Attached is another draft of Justice Brennan's dissent
in this case.

The only addition is a footnote, beginning

on page 14, which states that only 5 out of at least 18
states which have passed on this question have found a
distinction between pre- and post-indictment lineups.

It

also points out that every federal CA has held that the
Wade-Gilbert rule applies in the pre-indictment area.

Fi~

nally, it cites the most recent opinion from the CAlO in
which Judge Lewis states that the question is without
doubt.
LAH

~.

'•.

,I

6/5/72--LAH
Rea Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-5061

OT 1971

Judge•
Attached is the most recent draft of Justice Stewartgs
opinion in Kirby.
opinion (p. 9).

It adds your statement at the end of the
Upon seeing your notation on Friday, Mr.

Putzel called and asked for clarification.
and I agree, that you change the words

11

He suggested,

I concur in the

holding of the Court," to the followings "I concur in the
result reached by the Court."

Mr. Putzel says that words to

the latter effect more clearly state j j j j j that the author
does not join in the content of the plurality opinion.
In order to effect this change, if you agree with mr.
Putzel's suggestion, you should write a memo to Justd..ce
Stewart asking him to change your statement.

Since the

opinion may well come down this week, you should act on this
forthwith.
LAH
f\}ole:

1'1

"'7011
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~ P.: ~·
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..§uprtmt

<qllltrl of t4r 'J!Urif.eb' ..§taftg

~a:sfringtcn, ;!8. <q. 20biJ1·.;l
HAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 5, 1972

'
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... 1

•·

~

,.
.•.,.

Re: No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Illinois

,,

Dear Potter:

I.

The Reporter has suggested the following technical revision
of my concurrence:
"As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se
exclusionary rule, I concur in the result reached
by the Court. "
Please make this change, if this meets with your approval.
Sincerely,

I
•.

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
.
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June 5, 1972

Re: No. 70-5061 Kirby v. Wtnois

Dear Potter:
The Reporter has suggested the following technical revision
of my concurrence:
"As I would not extend the Wade-Ollbert ~ se
exclusionary rule, I coocur in the result reacned
by the Court. "

Please make this change, if this meets with your approval.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice stewart

cc: The Conference
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